Quick takes on Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the criminal cases People v. Wrice and People v. Torres and civil cases Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School District 152.5 and Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A.

CRIMINAL

People v. Wrice

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Stanley Wrice was charged with deviate sexual assault and rape in 1982. In a pretrial motion to suppress, Wrice alleged that his confession was involuntary because he had been beaten by Sergeant John Byrne and Detective Peter Dignan in the basement of the Area 2 police station in Chicago. The motion was denied, and Wrice was convicted. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 100 years. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Wrice also had two prior unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings, both presenting issues based on the methods used to obtain his confession.

In October 2007, Wrice sought leave to file a third post-conviction petition based on the 2006 Torture Report of the Special State’s Attorney, alleging that it substantiated his claim that his confession was involuntary, alleging a due process violation from the State’s introduction of co-defendant Bobby Williams’s testimony that was based on Williams’ coerced statement, and asserting a Brady violation based on the State’s failure to disclose what it knew – that Area 2 officers were brutalizing suspects to obtain confessions. The trial court denied leave to file.

The appellate court reversed, finding that Wrice had established cause for not presenting this particular claim earlier because the Torture Report was not issued until 2006 and prejudice because the introduction of a coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt is never harmless error.

In the Supreme Court, the State did not dispute that the 2006 Torture Report established cause.  As to prejudice, the State argued that People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987), which held that use of a coerced confession of guilt is never harmless error was no longer good law in light of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), which held (in a “fractured opinion”) that coerced confessions are subject to harmless error analysis.

In Wrice, the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in a detailed dissection of the varying opinions in Fulminante, and concluded that the rule set forth in Wilson “cannot stand as a matter of federal constitutional law.” The Court specifically declined to consider whether it could stand as a matter of state constitutional law because that question was not before the Court. The Court did not abandon with Wilson rule in its entirety, however, recasting the rule to state: “use of a defendant’s physically coerced confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is never harmless error.” The confession in Fulminante was the product of mental coercion, and the Court distinguished that case on that basis.

Because harmless error analysis was not applicable here, the Court upheld the appellate court’s determination that defendant had demonstrated prejudice sufficient to warrant leave to file the successive petition.  The court remanded for additional post-conviction proceedings, noting that Wrice will still have the evidentiary burden of establishing the allegations set forth in his petition.

This unanimous decision is important in that it reflects the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion that physically coerced confessions are particularly problematic and intolerable.  The Court left open the possibility of intervention by the United States Supreme Court, however, stating that “without additional guidance from the Supreme Court” it would not conclude that harmless error analysis was meant to apply to cases of police brutality and torture.  Also remaining for a future case is the question of whether admission of a coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt can ever be harmless error as a matter of Illinois constitutional law, regardless of whether the coercion was physical or
mental.

People v. Torres

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Torres was arrested in 1983 and charged with first degree murder arising out of a shooting death at a Chicago tavern.  A preliminary hearing was held, and probable cause was found.  Torres subsequently failed to appear for further proceedings.  He was not located until 2007, at which time he was arrested and the prosecution on the 1983 charge occurred.

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion seeking to admit at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of its key witness – the bartender at the tavern where the shooting occurred – because the bartender had been deported to Mexico in 1984. The court allowed the motion, over objectionby the defense.

The appellate court found that it was error to admit the prior testimony because there had not been adequate opportunity for effective cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. The appellate court characterized its holding as “evidentiary” and not constitutional in nature.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but concluded that the evidentiary and constitutional issues presented could not be readily separated. The Court found that admission of the preliminary hearing testimony violated Torres’s confrontation right, noting that whether the opponent had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination at the prior proceeding is one of the two factors to be considered in evaluating a
confrontation clause claim.

Here, the opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was limited by multiple factors: (1) defense counsel had not been given discovery demonstrating that the bartender had made prior inconsistent statements to the police; (2) defense counsel was not aware of the bartender’s status as an illegal alien, a fact that “may have furnished a formidable incentive” to curry favor with the prosecution; and (3) defense counsel’s cross-examination was restricted by the “atmosphere” in which it was conducted, specifically where the court’s sustaining of objections indicated its lack of enthusiasm about proceeding with the preliminary hearing.

This decision is significant in that the Court expressly clarified that for preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness to be subsequently admissible at trial, the preliminary hearing judge must have allowed full and fair cross-examination on “the highly relevant areas of the witness’ opportunity to observe, interest, bias, prejudice, and motive.” Presumably, if those requirements are met, admission will be allowed. If not, however, it is clear from this case that preliminary hearing testimony should not be admitted.

CIVIL

Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School District 152.5

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC
 
Does an entity empowered by the legislature to manage a financially troubled public school district's finances have the authority not only to cancel the school district's contracts but also to void the contract's penalties for early cancellation? According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the answer is "no."

In 2002, plaintiff, Innovative Modular Solutions, entered into several five-year contracts to lease portable classrooms to Hazel Crest School District 152.5. Several months after signing the contracts, at the request of the school district's board, the State Board of Education created a finanical oversight panel to address the district's acute financial crisis. Thus, the Hazel Crest School District Finance Authority ("Authority") was born.  It held broad power under a state statute allowing the creation of such entities to ensure the integrity of public schools through sound financial management. See 105 ILCS 5/1F-5(a)(3) (West 2004). Those powers include cancelling contracts (except collective-bargaining agreements). 105 ILCS 5/1F-25(2).

Citing as key the statute's language that such a panel must assist a school district to fulfill its mission of providing public education while also meeting "its obligations to its creditors and the holders of its debt," the supreme court found that the legislature intended school districts to honor its existing obligations. The court observed that, if need be, the Authority, like the school district, could borrow money or levy property taxes to raise sufficient funds. Thus, the contractual doctrine of legal impossibility did not excuse performance -- the school district did not have to comply with an invalid order of the Authority to default on the early cancellation obligations.   

Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A.

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd.

The Supreme Court held that a citizen suit may not be brought under section 8.05(a) (the citizen suit provision) of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act (“Mining Act”) to challenge site conditions at a coal mine reclaimed in accordance with permits previously approved by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (“IDNR”).  It also held that the Water Use Act of 1983 does not allow a private right of action to challenge activity authorized by a mining permit.

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of a six-count amended complaint filed by a not-for-profit citizen group against the defendants.  The plaintiffs had alleged violations of the Mining Act and the Water Use Act resulting from a coal mine reclamation.  

Because the IDNR had issued permits for the activities at issue in the suit, the matter was governed by section 8.10 of the Mining Act.  That section requires that the administrative review process is the exclusive route for circuit review of the terms of an IDNR-issued mining permit.  The Court similarly found that there was no statutory basis to glean a private right of action under the Water Use Act to challenge conduct that was specifically mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by the IDNR.

Posted on February 2, 2012 by Chris Bonjean
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