Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Friday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation and Lake County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch and the criminal case People v. Patterson.

CIVIL

Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams, Montgomery & John Ltd.

The plaintiffs in this case were physicians whose health care licenses were permanently revoked based upon prior convictions for battery or criminal sexual abuse of their patients.  They argued that section 2105-165 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law, which was the basis for the revocation, did not apply to people whose convictions predated the Act, that the Act was impermissibly retroactive, and that the enforcement violated various state and federal constitutional provisions.

The Supreme Court found “no merit” in any of plaintiff’s claims. The Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaints for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 2105-165 was enacted in 2011. It mandates permanent revocation, without a hearing, of the license of a health care worker who has been convicted of certain types of criminal offenses, such as “Sex Offender” offenses. Each of the plaintiffs had been convicted, before 2011, of the types of offenses included within the Act.

The Court held that the language of the Act, which provides that revocation applies when a health care worker “has been convicted,” indicated that the Act was intended to apply to convictions that predated the Act.

The Court found, however, that the statute was not impermissibly retroactive. Although the Act relied upon antecedent facts -- the plaintiffs’ convictions -- for its operation, it did not apply retroactively because it was imposing new per se eligibility requirements for the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Act did not retroactively change criminal penalties or render unlawful conduct that was previously lawful.

The Court held that the right to pursue a medical profession was not a fundamental right for substantive due process purposes. The Court concisely analyzed and rejected all other remaining arguments.

Lake County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

Lake County Grading Company, LLC v. Village of Antioch deals with the meaning and consequences of language in the Bond Act, 30 ILCS 550/1, which provides that bonds issued for municipal improvements are “deemed” to contain certain provisions relating to both performance and payment.  The plaintiff subcontracted with the developer of residential subdivisions in Antioch to provide labor and materials for  public improvements required under the contracts.  The plaintiff completed its work, but was not paid in full.  The contractor provided  bonds which dealt with  performance and completion, but which said nothing about payment of sub-contractors.  The developer declared bankruptcy.

The sub-contractor sued the Village, asserting that it was a third party beneficiary of the contracts between the developer and the Village.  The plaintiff claimed that the Village breached the contracts because the bonds did not contain language guaranteeing payment to sub-contractors as mandated by the Bond Act.

The Bond Act provides that a bond provided in these circumstances is deemed to include language by which the principal and sureties agree not only that the contract will be performed but also that all persons having contracts with the principal or sub-contractors will be paid.  The Bond Act further provides that a verified notice of claim on the bond must be filed within 180 days after the last work or the last furnishing of materials.  That notice of claim was not made here.  The contractor asserted it was suing on the contract, and not on the bond, and therefore did not have to give notice of a claim.

The court, with Justice Theis writing for the majority, reversed both the circuit and appellate courts which had entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the Village on the contract claim.  The supreme court held that the payment language of the statute was deemed to be included within the performance bonds provided.  As a result, the bonds provided by the developer to the Village ipso facto conformed with the requirements of the Bond Act.  Therefore, judgment was to be entered in favor of the Village on the contractual claim. 

Justice Freeman dissented at length. He provided a history of the evolution of the Bond Act, and disagreed that payment provisions must be deemed to be in a bond which related only to performance.  Justice Burke joined with him in that dissent.

CRIMINAL

People v. Patterson

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Ronald Patterson was a 15-year-old ward of the State when he was charged
with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a staff
member of the residential treatment facility where he lived.  He was
subject to automatic transfer to criminal court under 705 ILCS 405/5-130.
Following a trial, he was convicted of all three charges and sentenced to
consecutive terms of imprisonment of 12 years on each count, to be served
at 85% pursuant Truth-In-Sentencing.

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal from the appellate court's
decision reversing the trial court's denial of Patterson's motion to
suppress his statement to the police and denial of his request to admit
evidence of the victim's other sexual activity.  Patterson cross-appealed
on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for not presenting
additional evidence in support of the motion to suppress and challenging
the constitutionality of the automatic transfer provision.

The Court concluded that the trial court correctly denied the motion to
suppress, after considering several arguments presented by Patterson.
Specifically, the Court held that a youth officer was present, advised
Patterson of his rights, and attempted to provide notice to both the
director of the residential facility and the minor's caseworker that
Patterson was at the police station and was going to be questioned.  While
he did not reach either individual, the officer left voicemail messages
with both.  The officer also was told by a second officer that the
facility's director had previously been informed where Patterson was being
taken and that he had given the police permission to speak with Patterson.
The Supreme Court noted that the youth officer "undoubtedly could have
taken additional steps to notify a concerned adult," but no additional
steps were required by the statute [705 ILCS 405/5-405(2)].  The statute
only requires that the police make a "reasonable attempt" at notice, and
such attempts were made here.

The Court also rejected a challenge to the youth officer's actions during
the interview, where the youth officer did not take the lead and did not
abandon his role and engage in adverse participation against Patterson.
Likewise, the Court rejected a "totality of the circumstances" challenge to
the voluntariness of the statement, deferring to the trial court's factual
findings.  Finally, the Court declined to find ineffective assistance of
counsel for not introducing evidence of Patterson's diminished mental
capacity in support of the motion to suppress.  The Court considered the
prejudice prong first and found that Patterson had not demonstrated "a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the entire trial would have
changed, resulting in his acquittal," had his statement been excluded.

The Court also rejected Patterson's claim that he should have been
permitted to introduce evidence of the victim's sexual activity in the days
prior to the offense to provide an alternative explanation for cervical
inflammation noted by the examining doctor.  The Court found Patterson's
theory speculative, and also concluded that defense counsel had been able
to argue that the inflammation evidence was meaningless given the doctor's
testimony that he could not say when it occurred.

Perhaps most notable in this case are the constitutional challenges to the
automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act.  Specifically,
Patterson presented due process and 8th amendment challenges to the
statute's constitutionality.  The Court rejected the due process challenge
because Patterson based the challenge on the Roper, Graham, and Miller
decisions from the United States Supreme Court -- decisions which involved
8th amendment analyses, not due process anaylses.  The court concluded that
"a constitutional challenge raised under one theory cannot be supported by
decisional law based purely on another provision."  The Court went on to
reject Patterson's 8th amendment challenge, concluding that the automatic
transfer statute is not punitive, but merely a matter of procedure.  The
Court noted that there is no constitutional right to access to juvenile
court; it is a legislative creation in Illinois.  Patterson argued that the
interplay between automatic transfer, consecutive sentencing, and
Truth-in-Sentencing rendered the transfer provision unconstitutional as
applied to him, but the Court again disagreed.

Justice Theis dissented from the Court's opinion on the 8th amendment
challenge.  Citing extensively from the legislative history surrounding the
automatic transfer provision, Justice Theis concluded that the focus of the
statute was punitive.  She went on to note that the automatic transfer
provision is not unconstitutional merely because it is punitive, but rather
because "it runs afoul of 'evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.'"  Simply stated, "youth matters," and
statutes with mandatory sentencing consequences that fail to account for
juvenile's diminished culpability and individual characteristics are
constitutionally infirm.  Indeed, Justice Theis concluded that "criminal
procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at
all are flawed."

Notably, the majority acknowledged the absence of judicial discretion in
the automatic transfer provision and expressed concern over that absence.
The Court called upon the legislature to "review the automatic transfer
provision based on the current scientific and sociological evidence
indicating a need for the exercise of judicial discretion in determining
the appropriate setting for the proceedings in these juvenile cases."

Because Patterson had raised an excessive sentence claim that the appellate
court did not reach, the Supreme Court remanded for the appellate court to
consider that claim.